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Kant undoubtedly casts a long shadow in the history of 18th century German philosophy. Not 
only did he initiate a revolution in philosophy, but in the course of doing so he thoroughly 
exposed the metaphysical systems of his predecessors as rationalistic castles in the air. This 
latter, negative part of his project was in fact so successful that the pre-Kantian period of German 
philosophy is widely viewed, even today, as a period of benighted dogmatism. During this time, 
German philosophy, such as it was, is thought to be preoccupied with the sort of dry 
scholasticism and hidebound metaphysics that had long since been superseded in Britain and 
France, a circumstance reflected in the fact that nearly all intellectuals of note were university 
professors—male, of course, as women could not attend university—who published lengthy 
academic tomes (and even lectured) in Latin rather than the vernacular. Indeed, isolated from the 
rest of Europe by enduring confessional tensions and the convolutions of internal politics, the 
German-speaking lands that constituted the Holy Roman Empire might seem like a sort of 
intellectual island, a bulwark against the advance of modern philosophical innovations and a 
place from which few ideas of note ever emanated, not, that is, until the advent of the Kantian 
philosophy.  
Yet quite to the contrary of the whiggish philosophical histories Kant’s success inspired (and 
continues to inspire), the German-speaking lands of Europe in the period before Kant were host 
to a rich intellectual milieu. It was of course the homeland of Leibniz, whose contributions to the 
flourishing of intellectual culture include his sparse publications but also his fruitful efforts to 
found a German learned society and his support of forward-thinking philosophers for university 
positions, thereby accelerating Germany’s transition into the era of Enlightenment. German 
academic philosophers were thoroughly influenced by Leibniz’s thought, but their creative 
appropriations of it resulted in innovations such as the invention of the disciplines of aesthetics 
and empirical psychology. Germany was also the site of vigorous and publically-enacted 
intellectual disputes, such as that at the new university in Halle where the libertas philosophandi 
itself came under threat but was ultimately (if not immediately) vindicated. Outside of the 
academic context, radical philosophical thinking circulated underground in clandestine texts that 
linked Germany with the current of ideas flowing through the rest of Europe and Britain. It was, 
moreover, a period in the history of philosophy in which women and other under-represented 
thinkers contributed in integral ways to the conception, propagation, and refinement of modern 
ideas and to the expansion of the Enlightenment. In short, this is a vibrant period in the history of 
philosophy that is eminently worthy of study, even apart from its relation—whether as a foil or 
as a crucible—to the great philosopher of Königsberg. 
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1. Christian Thomasius 
1.1 Life and Works 
Christian Thomasius was born on January 1, 1655 in Leipzig. He was the son of Jakob 
Thomasius (1622–84), a well-known jurist and philosopher at the University of Leipzig who 
counted Leibniz among his students. Christian (hereafter simply ‘Thomasius’) matriculated in 
the philosophy faculty at Leipzig in 1669, and was promoted to Magister artium in 1672. As a 
result of his father’s lectures, particularly on Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis, and his 
interest in Samuel Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium, Thomasius took up the study of law 
in Frankfurt an der Oder in 1675 and was awarded a doctorate in 1679. After a brief journey to 
Holland, Thomasius returned to Leipzig where he worked (unhappily) as a lawyer while also 
holding private lectures on natural jurisprudence. Thomasius attests to the fundamental 
reorientation of his thinking effected by his reading of Pufendorf, and the Apologia pro se et suo 
libro (1674) in particular, which he credits for convincing him of the independence of natural 
law from theology as well as of the need to question authority and resist religious intolerance 
(Thomasius 1688, “Diss. Proem.” §§5-10; Hochstrasser 2000,113-21). This new cast of mind is 
clearly evident in a dissertation on bigamy of 1685, in which Thomasius defends the practice as 
consistent with natural law, and which unsurprisingly led to a confrontation with a professor in 
the theology faculty at Leipzig. Thomasius’ pioneering decision to hold lectures in German 
announced (in German) in 1687 likewise provoked controversy, as did his publication beginning 
in 1688 of a monthly journal (the first periodical published in German), entitled the 
Monatsgespräche, in which Thomasius commented, frequently satirically, on the local 
intellectual scene. Thomasius’ lectures and publications increasingly generated conflict with the 
theological faculty in Leipzig, which upheld a rather strict form of Lutheran orthodoxy, and 
while his connections with the Saxon court stood him in good stead for a time, his defense of an 
inter-faith marriage involving a (Lutheran) Saxon count and a (Calvinist) Brandenburg princess 
cost him his protection, and in March 1690 he was prohibited from publishing and holding 
lectures (private and academic) in Electoral Saxony.  
Thomasius sought refuge in Berlin, in the neighboring state of Brandenburg which was led by 
the Calvinist Elector Friedrich III (later king Friedrich I) and had a tradition of toleration. Partly 
through the support of Pufendorf himself, Thomasius was given an appointment as councillor to 
the court, and was allowed to lecture at the Ritterakademie in Halle an der Saale, which in 1694 
would become the Friedrichs-Universität, with Thomasius among the founding faculty (in law). 
Thomasius was soon joined by the Pietist orientalist, theologian and educational reformer, 
August Hermann Francke, who had likewise run afoul of the religious authorities in Leipzig. 
Thomasius himself had been sympathetic with the anti-scholastic and anti-authoritarian bent of 
the Pietists (see section 3.2 below), and had publicly defended Francke at one point in Leipzig; 
however, a public break occurred when Thomasius published a criticism, in 1699, of the 
pedagogy Francke had adopted in his famous educational institutions in Halle. Thomasius 
continued to stir controversy with his lectures and publications, which frequently over-reached 
the purview of the juristic faculty (such as his critical discussion of witchcraft trials—Beck 1969, 
253-4), and breached decorum by personally attacking his theological colleagues, all of which 
led to a reprimand from the Brandenburg court in 1702 and an order to adhere to the boundaries 
between faculties. Thomasius’ dissertation De concubinatu of 1713, in which he contended that 
the use of concubines does not violate the marriage contract given that the purpose of marriage is 
solely procreation, also generated heated discussion. While Thomasius and Francke reconciled in 
1714, Thomasius did not play a significant role in the later controversy between Wolff and the 
Pietists. He died in Halle on September 23, 1728. 
Thomasius’ works cover a wide range of topics. In addition to the topical essays and 
dissertations already mentioned, Thomasius published major texts on natural law, including the 
Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae (Institutions of Divine Jurisprudence) of 1688 and the 
Fundamentum iuris naturae et gentium (Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations) of 1705 
(for discussion of Thomasius’ contributions to natural law theory, which will not be taken up 
here, see especially Hochstrasser 2000, ch. 4; Kühnel 2001; and Lutterbeck 2002). Thomasius 
also published on topics in theoretical and practical philosophy, especially during his time in 
Halle. Thomasius wrote a number of texts on logic, such as the Introductio ad philosophiam 
auliam (Introduction to Court Philosophy) of 1688, as well as the Einleitung zur Vernunfft-Lehre 
(Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason) and the Ausübung der Vernunfft-Lehre (Application of 
the Doctrine of Reason) both of 1691. These were followed by a parallel exhibition of his moral 
philosophy in the Einleitung zur Sitten-Lehre (Introduction to the Doctrine of Morals) of 1692 
and the Ausübung der Sitten-Lehre (Application of the Doctrine of Morals) of 1696, as well as an 
influential excursion into metaphysics in the Versuch von Wesen des Geistes (Essay on the 
Essence of Spirit) in 1699. 
1.2 Philosophy 
Thomasius is decidedly not a systematic philosopher; instead, and quite consistent with his 
mature distaste for dogmatism in all its forms, he is best characterized as a conscientiously 
eclectic thinker (Albrecht 1994, 398-416; Bottin and Longo 2015, 301-15). That said, 
Thomasius’ thought is unified by an overarching conviction in the priority of practical life, and 
the belief that erudition in whatever sphere of knowledge should be pursued for the sake of the 
improvement of our will and intellect for use in our ordinary life. This is made clear, for 
instance, in the definition of learnedness (“Gelahrheit”) that Thomasius provides at the outset of 
his Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason:  
 Learnedness is knowledge through which the human being is made capable of properly 
 distinguishing the true from the false and the good from the bad [...] in order that one 
 might promote one’s own temporal and lasting welfare, and that of others, in ordinary life 
 and affairs. (Thomasius 1691a, ch. 1, §1/Dyck 2019, 18) 
Significantly, and unlike subsequent Enlightenment thinkers, Thomasius is also explicit in 
holding that because the attainment of learnedness is possible wholly through the use of the 
natural (rather than the supernatural) light of the mind (cf. Thomasius 1691a, ch. 1, §16), it is 
accessible by all, regardless of gender or class (cf. Section 6.1, below).  
In light of this, the aim of logic for Thomasius is to cultivate the powers of the mind, and the 
faculty of reason in particular, so that we are capable of discerning what the natural light of the 
mind reveals to be true or false in any field to which it is applied. This involves not just 
supplying positive guidance with respect to how truth might be recognized and attained, but also 
negatively identifying and dispelling prejudices that obscure the natural light. Thomasius’ logic, 
therefore, is not primarily intended to offer a theory of demonstration (as with scholastic logics) 
nor an organon for specifically scientific discovery (as with Cartesian logics or, later, with 
Wolff’s logic). This distinctive aim does not, however, prevent him from weighing in on matters 
of traditional logical and epistemological import; for instance, he contends that thought has to do 
with images ultimately derived from the external senses (thereby rejecting innate ideas—
Thomasius 1691a, ch. 3, §22), and he outlines a theory of demonstration that focuses on 
preserving conviction in truths through their connection to incontrovertible first principles. 
Thomasius’ Application of the Doctrine of Reason contributes to the project initiated in the 
Introduction by providing people with the means of avoiding error. Avoiding error involves the 
eradication of prejudices, which are among the causes of the corruption of reason and which are 
grouped into two main groups, namely, prejudices of authority and of precipitancy or hastiness. 
That, in turn, is accomplished through what he identifies as dogmatic doubt, not the Cartesian 
doubt that deems everything false so as to find a first indubitable principle, which is a pointless 
enterprise, according to Thomasius. Dogmatic doubt is the doubt about particular things, beliefs, 
and opinions, and this he found healthy and conducive to preventing error. 
In any case, the centerpiece of Thomasius’ logic, and probably its most influential aspect, is his 
theory of truth. According to Thomasius’ definition, truth consists in “nothing other than an 
agreement between human thoughts and the constitution of things outside your thoughts” 
(Thomasius 1691a, ch. 5, §13/Dyck 2019, 28). While this definition contains the classical 
correspondence theory of truth (in accordance with which truth consists in the correspondence of 
our thoughts with things), Thomasius contends that the correspondence works in the other 
direction as well, namely, that truth also requires the correspondence of things with our powers 
of thought:  
 Here, however, you should not ask whether the understanding must agree with things, or 
 the things with the understanding; rather this harmony is so constituted that neither
 provides the guiding principle for the other, but this harmony is simultaneously 
 presupposed by both even though external things as it were initiate it. (Thomasius 1691a 
 ch. 5, §14/Dyck 2019, 28)  
In accordance with this conception of truth, Thomasius conceives of the mind as fundamentally 
active with its ideas (rather than merely passively reflecting the order of nature) such that things 
must be in agreement with its nature and capacities in order to be cognized or willed. Thomasius 
does not himself explore the principles that might govern the mind’s activity nor draw any 
idealistic consequences from this conception of truth—that, for instance, things insofar as they 
agree with our intellect might differ considered apart from it—though his successors such as 
Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann and Christian August Crusius would (cf. section 5.2 below). 
This conception of the human mind as fundamentally active is taken up again in Thomasius’ lone 
substantial contribution to metaphysics, the Essay on the Essence of Spirit, where Thomasius 
distinguishes spirit (Geist) from matter in virtue of its activity. While this would appear to result 
in a metaphysical dualism, Thomasius complicates things by endorsing a hierarchy of spirits, not 
just between the human being and God, but also a class of spirits responsible for various effects 
in bodies (such as heating and cooling). Yet, his further postulation of an “air and light spirit [ein 
Lufft- und Licht-Geist]” which fills the spaces between parts of matter, not to mention his 
apparent identification of space itself as “pure spirit” (Thomasius 1699, 60, 167-8) muddles the 
original, starkly dualistic picture. 
Thomasius's moral theory is a theory of the will. He held that in moral matters, the will 
dominates reason. While human beings have free choice if not externally constrained, the will is 
not free; rather, it is dominated by human affects—our passions, impulses, and desires. Like 
Hobbes, Thomasius believed that even though subject to such inner (psychological) constraints, 
the will still chooses (with the aid of reason); it consciously wills. And a conscious choice is 
precisely what is required for a (good) action to be considered moral: a good instinct or good 
inclinations may make us good, may even be desirable, but by itself this is not enough to make 
us moral. Morality requires a conscious act of will. The trouble with morality arises because the 
will is determined by evil desires, in particular, lust, ambition, and avarice. Although there are 
noble sentiments as well, which similarly influence the will, they are in conflict with the negative 
dispositions. The conflict can be brought to a positive conclusion only by appeal to divine grace 
(God's salvation), and Thomasius Application of the Doctrine of Morals is notable for its positive 
treatment of mystical experience.  
Thomasius’ moral philosophy is accordingly informed by theological considerations in a way not 
shared by his works in theoretical philosophy. While, in the theoretical context, he did believe in 
natural reason's capacity to overcome corruption, in the practical context he held that an evil will 
is at the root of our corruption, and to ameliorate it we require God's grace. Moreover, 
Thomasius’s moral outlook seems to develop from his initial presentation of his morality the 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Morals in 1692, which is an optimistic affirmation of the viability 
of a moral position he identified as one involving “rational love” (vernünftige Liebe) as the only 
means to a “happy, courteous and cheerful life,” to a more pessimistic position in his Application 
in 1696 where he contends that human self-interest and an evil will constitute significant 
obstacles to (this is likely on account of his Pietist conversion during the period; cf. Beck 1969, 
251; Ahnert 2006, 27-42). 
This ambivalence and return to theology aside, Thomasius's moral position is a distinctive one. 
The theory of rational love is based on the fundamental equality of human beings as well as on 
their ability to think and choose independently (of authority). Ultimately, Thomasius's ethics is a 
social ethics. The theory is other-directed, and given the absence of laws and principles, 
constitutes a contrast to the formalist universalist ethics Kant would develop by the end of the 
next century. At the same time, the lack of any way of making this theory applicable in a context 
governed not by similar but instead by conflicting interests, makes something like a fomalist 
ethics an inevitability. By the end of the Introduction to Moral Theory, even Thomasius 
recognises that “rational love” will function only in relatively harmonious contexts. In other 
contexts, however, particularly those characterised by unequal power positions, justice may well 
be required, a distinction Thomasius influentially characterizes in terms of one between 
“internal” and “external” obligation (cf. Barnard 1988; Schneewind 1998,165-6).  
2. Radical Philosophy 
Through the efforts of Thomasius, and later Christian Wolff, the Friedrichs-Universität in Halle 
became the intellectual center of the early Enlightenment in Germany. And despite, for instance, 
Thomasius’ conflict with Orthodox Lutheranism in Leipzig, and Wolff’s controversy with his 
Pietist colleagues (section 3.3, below), neither were explicitly hostile towards religious belief, the 
Church, or to (appropriately exercised) religious authority; nor for that matter did either seek to 
challenge the existing political order. Beyond the German academy, however, a more radical 
philosophical tradition flourished, one that drew on the thought of, among others, Hobbes, 
Gassendi, and Spinoza, and proliferated through the transmission of clandestine literature within 
networks that spanned across Europe. While there was considerable diversity among the views 
held by the thinkers within this radical philosophical tradition, they tended to be highly critical of 
organized religion (if not necessarily professed atheists) and of the established political order, 
rejected the authority of the Bible as a source of revealed truth, and defended a (not always 
sophisticated) materialistic conception of the soul (cf. Stiehler 1966; Israel 2001, 628-36; 
Mulsow 2015). It bears noting that while this tradition flourished outside of a narrow academic 
context, there was nonetheless considerable exchange and mutual influence between figures in 
both the mainstream and radical traditions. 
Among the most important German thinkers within this radical philosophical tradition, and quite 
representative of its intellectual diversity, are Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch (1648–1704) and 
Theodor Ludwig Lau (1670–1740). Stosch was the son of a Reformed minister and court 
chaplain in Brandenburg and worked as a court secretary until ill-health forced him to resign in 
1686. Stosch subsequently pursued philosophical interests and in 1692 published his sole known 
text, the Concordia rationis et fidei (Concord of Reason and Faith). In spite of its title, the 
Concord seeks to subordinate the claims of faith to the canons of reason, in accordance with a 
broadly Socinian outlook, and Stosch denies that there is any basis in reason for conviction in the 
natural immortality of the soul (for which he also provides a materialist account), and rejects the 
reasonableness of eternal damnation. Stosch’s Concord was published anonymously (with 
Amsterdam listed as the place of publication) with only 100 copies printed, but when these were 
discovered for sale, they were seized and burned. Stosch was forced to identify himself as the 
author, was arrested, and subsequently investigated by a committee consisting of, among others, 
Pufendorf, concluding with Stosch’s public retraction of the book in 1694.  
Lau had studied law in his home town of Königsberg before moving to Halle in 1694 where he 
attended lectures by Thomasius. In 1695, he embarked on a trip through Europe and England 
(where he apparently met Newton), taking up a position as councillor with the young Duke of 
Courland on his return. The early death of his patron saw Lau turn to intellectual pursuits, and in 
1717 he published a number of treatises on various subjects, including the anonymous 
Meditationes philosophicae de Deo, mundo et homine (Philosophical Meditations concerning 
God, the World, and the Human Being). The text covers a wide range of philosophical (and 
medical and political) topics, and is distinctive in its eclectic borrowings from Spinoza, Locke, 
Plotinus, and Giordano Bruno, among others. Its general philosophical outlook might most 
accurately be characterized as pantheistic, both in the Spinozistic sense inasmuch as Lau defends 
the world’s pre-existence in God and denies its creation ex nihilo (although the extent of Lau’s 
Spinozism is disputed; cf. Schröder 1987, 128-32), but also and especially in the sense of the 
Irish freethinker John Toland’s pantheism inasmuch as Lau attempts to outline the foundations of 
a universal religion. Due to its strident denunciation of the clergy and a genealogical critique of 
the current political order, the Meditations was instantly controversial, and Lau’s publisher was 
eventually pressured into revealing Lau’s authorship. This led to Lau’s imprisonment, during 
which he attempted suicide, and his subsequent expulsion from Frankfurt am Main; Lau’s appeal 
to his mentor, Thomasius, for a review of the proceedings was also met with a painful 
denunciation. Lau attempted to return to his study of the law, but his unorthodox opinions and 
previous brush with infamy made this impossible (in spite of a formal recantation of his earlier 
views). He died, in poor mental health, in Altona in 1740. 
3. The Controversy between Wolff and the Pietists 
Thomasius would continue to exercise an important influence on German philosophy throughout 
the first half of the 18th century. However, it was his colleague in the philosophy faculty at the 
Friedrichs-Universität, Christian Wolff, who would contribute the most to the modernization of 
the German intellectual landscape and the spread of the Enlightenment. Wolff achieved this 
primarily through his distinctive philosophical system, the so-called “Leibnizian-Wolffian” 
philosophy, which incorporated the latest philosophical ideas and methods, including but not 
limited to those of Leibniz himself. The relevance and accessibility of Wolff’s system, expanded 
and refined by his many students, quickly saw it gain a foothold in academies across Germany. 
Wolff was not without his detractors, of course, and none were more vocal, nor more successful 
(at least initially) in their efforts to limit his influence, than his Pietist colleagues in the faculty of 
theology. The famous controversy between Wolff and the Pietists, which at its climax saw Wolff 
exiled from Prussia on pain of hanging in 1723, put the full menu of modern ideas—including 
materialism, idealism, atheism, and Spinozism—before the literate public and drew the attention 
of the rest of Europe to the German intellectual scene.  
3.1 The “Leibnizian-Wolffian” Philosophy 
Christian Wolff was born in Breslau (today, Wrocław) on January 24, 1679. By all accounts a 
gifted student, he developed an interest in theology and mathematics during his time in 
Gymnasium, and studied theology and mathematics at the University of Jena and then in Leipzig, 
gaining his Magister at Leizpig in 1702. His subsequent Habilitationsschrift on introducing 
mathematical method to practical philosophy drew Leibniz's attention to him. They began a 
correspondence that continued until Leibniz's death in 1716, and which covered topics from 
mathematics to metaphysics. Partially through Leibniz’s support, Wolff was appointed to a 
vacant chair in mathematics at the Friedrichs-Universität in Halle, delivering his inaugural 
lecture in 1707.  
Understandably, given the nature of his position, most of Wolff’s initial publications were 
devoted to mathematics and natural science, including an introduction to mathematics in 1710 
and an influential mathematical dictionary in 1716. Around 1710, however, he began to lecture 
on more narrowly philosophical topics, publishing his Vernünfftige Gedancken von den 
Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkäntnis der 
Wahrheit (Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding and its Propert 
Use in the Cognition of Truth) [the “German Logic,” hereafter GL] in 1713. Thus began 
Wolff’s famous series of German-language textbooks on philosophical topics, which would 
grow to include the Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, 
auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Rational Thoughts on God, the World and the Soul of Man, 
and on All Things in General) [the “German Metaphysics,” hereafter GM] in 1719 (albeit 
with a publication date of 1720), and the Vernünfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und 
Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit (Rational Thoughts on Human Actions for the 
Promotion of their Happiness) [the “German Ethics,” hereafter GE] in 1720, followed by the 
“German Politics” in 1721, the “German Physics” in 1723, and the “German Teleology” in 
1724. 
This series of texts constitutes the first presentation of the so-called “Leibnizian-Wolffian” 
philosophy that would come to dominate the philosophical landscape in Germany. There is, of 
course, no question that Wolff’s philosophical system is thoroughly informed by Leibniz’s: 
Wolff himself admits that the reading of Leibniz’s 1684 essay “Meditations on Cognition, Truth, 
and Ideas,” and Leibniz’s classifcation of ideas in particular, had sparked a “great light” that 
informed his German Logic (cf. GL “Vorrede”); moreover, Wolff himself reports that he 
incorporated a number of Leibnizian concepts into his presentation of ontology, cosmology, and 
rational psychology in the German Metaphysics (cf. Wuttke 1841, 141-2). Even so, Wolff 
himself points out that when he started writing his series of philosophical textbooks there were 
few of Leibniz’s texts available through which one might get a sense of the wider Leibnizian 
philosophy (Wuttke 1841, 140-1; cf. also Wilson 1994); thus he takes issue with the designation 
of his system as “Leibnizian-Wolffian”—a coinage he credits to one of his students, Georg 
Bernhard Bilfinger (Wuttke 1841, 142), but which was likely due to his Pietist opponents 
(Wundt 1945, 150). The extent of Leibniz’s influence on Wolff is widely debated (cf. Corr 1975; 
École 1998), but it is in any case clear that Leibniz is not the sole, nor in every case the most 
important, influence on the development of Wolff’s ideas, as figures such as Ehrenfried Walther 
von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708), John Locke, and late Scholastic thinkers also exerted an 
important influence on his metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of science (Neveu 2018; 
Leduc 2018; Dyck forthcoming). 
Turning to a brief overview of Wolff’s philosophical works, the German Logic is intended, quite 
in contrast to Thomasius’, as a handbook for the acquisition, justification, and orderly 
presentation of scientific cognition. So, in addition to the now expected treatment of concepts, 
propositions, and syllogisms, Wolff’s text contains discussion of drawing universal propositions 
from individual experiences, of experiments, and of science and its distinction from faith and 
opinion. Moreover, the German Logic contains Wolff’s mature presentation of his mathematical 
method, through which we proceed from definitions and axioms to the formulation of theorems 
and postulates, and ultimately to demonstrations, and it outlines how the method can be 
employed for the purpose of scientific discovery (for discussion, see Frketich 2019; Gava 2019). 
Significantly, it is this method that gains widespread application throughout Wolff’s 
philosophical enterprise, including in his metaphysics.  
The German Metaphysics was Wolff’s next major philosophical text, and in it he formally 
introduces the division of metaphysical topics into ontology, cosmology, empirical and rational 
psychology and natural theology, a division that Kant, among others, would subsequently take 
up. The initial chapter attempts to make evident, in a Cartesian vein, both an indubitable truth 
(“we are certain that we exist”) and to establish a canon for what will count as a certain 
cognition for the remainder of the enterprise. In the second chapter Wolff sets out the two 
(Leibnizian) principles governing his philosophical thought: the principle of contradiction 
(“something cannot both be and not be at the same time” GM §10) and the principle of sufficient 
reason. Significantly, Wolff suggests that while the first is self-evident, the second admits of 
proof, for which Wolff (in a departure from Leibniz_ offers two arguments. The first proceeds as 
follows: 
 Were it the case that something could be, or take place, in a thing without a reason why it 
 should occur being met with either in that thing itself or something else, then it would 
 come to be from nothing. Since, however, it is impossible that something could come to 
 be from nothing, everything that is must have a sufficient reason why it is. (GM 
 §30/Dyck 2019, 101) 
In the remainder of the ontology, Wolff provides accounts of concepts that will be key for his 
subsequent treatment of specific metaphysical topics, including essence and attribute, space and 
time, simple and composite, substance, power, and cause. 
The chapters on empirical and rational psychology outline an account of the soul in general and 
of the human soul in particular. In his empirical treatment, Wolff considers what can be known 
of the soul by means of our ordinary inner experience. He contends that we can distinguish 
thoughts in terms of obscurity, clarity, and distinctness, but we can also distinguish the soul’s 
representations in terms of their content. Accordingly, they can be classified into sensations, 
imaginings, and thoughts proper, which can in turn be traced back to various faculties of the 
soul, including sensibility, imagination, and the understanding, in virtue of which it is capable of 
these distinct thoughts. We also discern that the soul is subject to pleasure and displeasure in its 
(distinct or indistinct) cognition of good and evil, which give rise to desires and willing (based 
on indistinct and distinct cognition respectively), and when that willing is in accordance with 
what pleases the soul the most then, for Wolff, its acts are free (GM §519).  
On the basis of these empirical cognitions of the soul, rational psychology seeks to draw 
inferences regarding the soul’s essence and nature. Wolff argues that the soul must be immaterial 
given that it is impossible that a body should think (GM §738), and as a result that the soul is a 
simple substance endowed with a power of which its thoughts are effects, which power is 
identified as a power of representation (GM §§742-7). This secures the soul’s natural 
immortality, or incorruptibility, but Wolff argues for the soul’s personal immortality, or its 
preservation of its state of conscious representation and memory in the afterlife (GM §§925-6). It 
is in the context of rational psychology that Wolff also offers a defense of the Leibnizian 
doctrine of pre-established harmony (§765), which he think accounts for the empirically-
observed agreement between the states of the soul and the body better than the competing 
systems of physical influence and occasional causation. 
The final pair of topics concern the world (cosmology) and God (natural theology). Regarding 
the former, Wolff identifies the world as the “series of changeable things that are next to one 
another and follow one upon the other” (GM §544/Dyck 2019, 120). As such, the world is a 
composite consisting of ultimately simple substances, though Wolff declines to identify them as 
Leibnizian monads (GM §§598-9). Things and events in the world are nonetheless contected to 
one another in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, and Wolff concludes that all 
events are certain as a result (GM §561). Concerning God, Wolff argues that He must exist 
inamsuch as our own evident existence requires a necessary being to serve as its sufficient 
reason, which necessary being must also be independent, eternal, and simple (GM §§928-936); it 
cannot, therefore, be the world (a composite) nor our own soul (a being dependant on the world), 
and so can only be God (GM §945). In addition to these attributes, God must have an 
understanding, through which He distinctly represents all that is possible, and a free will 
inasmuch as He chooses that world which pleases Him most to make actual (GM §980). 
Rounding out Wolff’s major philosophical works of this period, the German Ethics is composed 
of four parts, a theoretical part that treats the foundation of practical philosophy and three 
practical parts that present a doctrine of duties that human beings have towards themselves, God, 
and others. The central notion in Wolff’s ethics is the (metaphysical) notion of perfection which 
concerns the “agreement” of elements in a given manifold (cf. GM §152), and which is cognized 
through our intellectual powers. It is the cognition of the (apparent) perfection in an action that 
moves us to act, a fact that accounts for Wolff’s emphasis on the duty to cultivate our 
understanding among our duties to ourselves so that we can be moved to act in (what are in fact) 
the most perfect ways. Promoting the perfection of ourselves and others serves for Wolff as the 
univeral rule in accordance with which we ought to choose between two (or more) possible 
actions (GE §12). That is to say, when making a free choice we ought to consider whether the 
action “promotes the perfection of our inner and outer state” (GE §2) and that means considering 
whether the state of the soul and the body accords with the prior state or contradicts it. The 
outcome has greater perfection to the extent that it contributes to the continued “natural human 
state and its harmonious preservation over time”(GE §2). The natural human state Wolff 
envisions is the state of the soul in its manifold efforts to find truth, and everything has to be 
done to maximize that state. It so happens, that this is where happiness lies as well, and as Wolff 
indicates at the end of the ethics, it is incumbent upon human beings to ensure not only their own 
perfection/happiness, but to “contribute as much as possible to the happiness of others” (GE 
§767). 
3.2 The Halle Pietists 
Next to Thomasius and Wolff, the most important intellectual figure in the early history of the 
Friedrichs-Universität in Halle was August Hermann Francke (1663–1723). As we have seen, 
Francke had courted controversy in Leipzig through his involvement in the Pietist movement. 
Pietism was a spiritual movement within the Lutheran tradition that rejected the scholastic and 
theological turn that Lutheranism had taken and proposed a further, internal reformation to 
supplement the already-effected external one, and aimed at cultivating a “living faith” rather than 
mere lip-service to Christian ideals. The Pietists sought the personal and interior experience of a 
relationship to Christ, an individual transformation that was the result of an act of divine grace 
modelled on Francke’s own conversion experience (cf. Wallmann 1990, 63-4). To this end, the 
Pietists focused on the study of the Bible itself and devotional literature in small groups—the so-
called conventicles or collegia pietatis—which were notable, and controversial, for welcoming 
the involvement of women (Albrecht 2004; Gierl 2015).  
After falling out (in spite of Thomasius’ support) with the Lutheran authorities in Leipzig, 
Francke followed Thomasius to Halle. He took up a position as a pastor in the neighboring town 
of Glaucha, and held lectures on oriental languages in 1692. Francke was himself a disciple of 
the movement’s intellectual founder, Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), though Francke 
contributed immeasurably to the spread of Pietism, primarily through his educational institutions 
in Halle, beginning with a school for poor children founded in 1695. Through the institutions that 
arose from this humble school, Francke sought a reform of educational principles in line with 
Pietist ideals, and in this was enormously successful. The pedagogical institutions supplied an 
influential model for similar institutions in and outside of Germany (especially due to the fact 
that it was a largely self-funded philanthropic institution), became the hub of an expansive 
missionary network, and trained the next generation of German theologians, as well as some 
philosophers (like A. G. Baumgarten), not to mention Prussian civil administrators, bureaucrats, 
and pastors. Indeed, Francke enjoyed a close relationship to the Prussian court, and king 
Friedrich Wilhelm I became an enthusiastic supporter of his projects after a visit to Halle (cf. 
Hinrichs 1971). 
Another significant member of the theology faculty in Halle was Joachim Lange (1670–1744). 
Lange had come under Francke’s tutelage in Leipzig (where he also met Thomasius), following 
him to Erfurt and (briefly) Halle, before taking up positions at various Gymnasia in and around 
Berlin. During this time he also lectured on classical languages and wrote a very successful Latin 
grammar. In 1709, he accepted an appointment at the Friedrichs-Universität, in the theology 
faculty that was now thoroughly steeped in Francke’s Pietism. During his time in Berlin, Lange 
completed a notable philosophical work, the Medicina mentis (Medicine of the Mind), printed in 
Halle in 1704. Lange’s text shares a title with Tschirnhaus’ Medicina mentis of 1687, but little 
else as Lange instead emphasizes the futility and vanity of human attempts to attain cognition 
through their own efforts, highlighting the mind’s proneness to error and prejudice in its fallen 
state. Rather, according to Lange, it is only by means of divine grace and the divine light that we 
can heal the corrupted intellect and the will (Schönfeld 2016). 
A final figure worthy of mention in this context, albeit not strictly-speaking a Pietist thinker, is 
Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729). Budde had studied theology in Wittenberg, and after lecturing 
at Jena, had been called to an appointment in moral philosophy at Halle in 1693, where he 
remained until returning to Jena in 1705 as a professor of theology. Budde adopted a 
conscientiously eclectic philosophical outlook, one influenced by Thomasius, and which also 
informed his theological commitments to Lutheranism (if not to Pietism specifically). A prolific 
writer, he published a number of philosophical works during his time in Halle, including the 
Institutiones philosophiae eclecticae that appeared in two parts in 1703. The two parts are the 
“Elementa philosophiae theoreticae,” roughly a metaphysics, and the “Elementa philosophiae 
instrumentalis,” Budde’s logic. A later work, entitled Theses theologicae de atheismo et 
superstitione (1717), is also notable in that Budde seeks to refute various threats to natural and 
revealed religion, including Spinozism (cf. Rumore 2019, 44-8), an issue that would come to the 
fore in the coming controversy with Wolff. 
3.3 The Controversy and its Aftermath 
The controversy between Wolff and his Pietist colleagues is not typically held to be of much 
philosophical significance. Rather, the Pietist hostility towards Wolff is taken to be a reflection 
of their fundamentally un-enlightened anti-intellectualism, and the outbreak of the controversy 
itself a result of personal and professional rivalries—competition for students and university 
chairs. That this appraisal is generally accepted is to no small extent due to the efforts of 
subsequent histories of the dispute written by devoted Wolffians, such as C. G. Ludovici (1707-
78) and Georg Volckman Hartmann (1690?-17??). And while it cannot be denied that the 
voluminous texts exchanged during the course of the controversy, on both sides, only 
infrequently rise above the level of the polemical, it would be unfair to dismiss the ground of the 
Pietists’ objections as philosophically insignificant, or indeed irrelevant for the subsequent 
development of German philosophy (up to and including Kant).  
The controversy itself was the result of long-simmering tensions between Wolff and the Pietists. 
Wolff’s turn to lecturing on philosophical topics, such as metaphysics (including a treatment of 
natural theology), beginning in 1710, not to mention his discussion in the German Logic of 
Scriptural interpretation, provoked the ire of the theology faculty and led to warnings to their 
students about attending Wolff’s lectures (on account of his “Atheisterey”; cf. Beutel 2007, 165-
6). The publication of Wolff’s German Metaphysics in 1719, with its peculiar proof of God’s 
existence and apparent endorsement of natural necessitation, provided a broad target for their 
critical attention. This largely behind-the-scenes friction broke into the open with Wolff’s 
address on July 12, 1721, on the occasion of the transition of the pro-rectorship from himself to 
Lange, in which he defended the consistency of Confucian (i.e., non-Christian) practical 
philosophy with Enlightened reason (and Wolffian moral philosophy in particular; cf. Albrecht 
1985).  
The address caused an uproar among the Pietists and Francke demanded to see a copy of Wolff’s 
address to scrutinize for himself, which request Wolff denied citing the independence of the 
philosophy faculty. Lange at this point took up the study of Wolff’s metaphysics, penning a 
damning appraisal for the theology faculty that was sent to the authorities in Berlin. Wolff was 
invited to reply, and his rejection of the hostile characterization of his views led to the formation 
of an official commission in late October 1723 to investigate the charges against Wolff. The king 
himself would soon intervene, and decisively: after the dangers of Wolffian philosophy were 
explained to two of his generals visiting Halle—the doctrine of the pre-established harmony in 
particular was said to justify the desertion of soldiers (Beutel 2007, 189)—and this threat 
conveyed to the king, Friedrich Wilhelm I asked his trusted advisor Francke to outline the 
problematic doctrines defended by Wolff, which he promptly did. Horrified by Wolff’s evident 
godlessness, the king dismissed Wolff from his position and ordered him to leave Prussia in 48 
hours on pain of hanging, an order that was received in Halle on November 12, 1723. Wolff 
reacted swiftly, crossing over to nearby Electoral Saxony, refunding his students’ fees, and 
ultimately took up the offer of a position in Marburg where he received an enthusiastic reception.  
Wolff’s expulsion only meant that the dispute moved into the public domain, and the next decade 
would see dozens of treatises exchanged between Wolff (and his defenders) and his opponents, 
Lange and Budde foremost among them. A range of issues were canvassed in the debate. So, the 
issue of the libertas philosophandi had already surfaced in the conflict between the philosophical 
and theological faculties, and there were significant differences between Wolff and the Pietists 
concerning the ground of moral obligation (Grote 2017); however, the principal topics were 
metaphysical. These include the pre-established harmony, which Lange rejected as inconsistent 
with any proper union between soul and body, defending instead a natural connection between 
them achieved through physical influx (Lange 1724, 48-50/Dyck 2019, 141-2).  
Even so, the Pietists’ foremost philosophical concern was with preserving the genuine freedom 
of the human (and divine) will against Wolff’s apparent assaults (cf. Bianco 1989). According to 
Lange, Wolff’s endorsement of the principle of sufficient reason has the consequence of 
reducing the soul to an automaton and rendering the series of events that constitute the world a 
fatally determined concatenation. The result is a necessitarianism distinguishable from total 
Spinozism only because Wolff accepts a plurality of substances (Lange 1724, 72-3/Dyck 2019, 
153). Against this, Lange contends that the freedom (rather than mere spontaneity) of the will is 
directly evident through experience (particularly through our conscience) and constitutes the 
essence of the human being, that it is required for moral responsibility and religion, and that it 
serves to exempt human beings from the chain of natural necessitation. In spite of his 
unsympathetic reception in the history of philosophy, Lange succeeds in outlining a coherent 
antithesis to the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of the soul and its place in nature, one that 
would prove influential for later Pietist critics (like Crusius) and that would also form an 
important part of the background to Kant’s own later discussion of freedom.  
As far as the aftermath of the controversy, after their initial success Lange and the Pietists 
suffered diminished influence at the Prussian court. By contrast, the affair only served to burnish 
Wolff’s European reputation. In Prussia, Wolff’s works on metaphysics and practical philosophy 
were added to the list of atheist books, but he now saw himself as speaking to Europeans, not 
merely Germans, and began a series of Latin works, commencing with the Philosophia rationalis 
sive logica (Latin Logic) in 1728. Friedrich Wilhelm I seemed to think better of his precipitous 
decision and invited Wolff to return to Prussia in 1733, an invitation which Wolff declined. But 
the ban on his writings was reversed in 1734, and the verdict of an inter-confessional Prussian 
commission in 1737 vindicated Wolff’s philosophy of the charges levelled by the Pietists. The 
crown prince (Friedrich II) was an enthusiastic booster of Wolff at the court (and no friend of the 
Pietists), and with his ascension in 1740 he invited Wolff to return to Prussia.After turning down 
the proferred presidency of the Berlin Academy, Wolff returned to a professor- and vice-
chancellorship in Halle to great acclaim, devoting his remaining time to completing his works on 
practical philosophy.  
4. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 
A. G. Baumgarten is best known for authoring the textbook in metaphysics that Kant used for his 
lectures on the topic, though he was an important and innovative thinker in his own right. His 
philosophical ambitions are, moreover, deeply informed by the controversy in Halle, as he had 
an abiding intellectual sympathy with Wolffianism but deep and personal connections to the 
Pietists. Among his students was the notable Wolffian philosopher Georg Friedrich Meier 
(1717–77), and his own influence extended to Kant but also to Moses Mendelssohn and J. G. 
Herder. 
4.1 Life and Works 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten was born in Berlin on June 17, 1714. Baumgarten’s mother died 
when he was three, and his father, a garrison chaplain and pastor, died when he was eight in 
1722, leaving him to the care of his grandmother and older brothers. In accordance with his 
father’s wishes, Baumgarten went to Halle to study, enrolling in the Latin school at Francke’s 
Waisenhaus where his older brother Siegmund Jakob (1706–57), who would himself become a 
famous theologian, was an inspector. Baumgarten thrived in his studies, and in 1730 matriculated 
at the university, where he attended lectures by Francke and Lange in theology. While it was still 
forbidden to teach Wolff’s philosophy, Baumgarten undertook (with his brother’s 
encouragement) a thorough study of Wolff’s thought, lecturing on his logic in the Latin school 
and visiting Wolffians at the university in Jena. Baumgarten turned to the study of philosophy, 
attaining his Magister in 1735, and held lectures on logic and Wolffian metaphysics, dictating 
from his own notes on the latter (rather than a textbook) from which notes his own Metaphysica 
later derives. In 1736, a chronic lung ailment interrupted his academic work and saw him 
hospitalized in Berlin, returning to Halle in 1737 where he continued to lecture to great acclaim. 
His position at Halle had been as an (unpaid) extraordinary professor, but in 1739 he was called 
to a position at the university at Frankfurt an der Oder, and he left Halle in 1740 just before 
Wolff’s triumphant return. In Frankfurt, Baumgarten lectured widely in philosophy, including on 
aesthetics for the first time in 1742. Health problems, likely tuberculosis, and other difficulties, 
marked the last decade of Baumgarten’s life, and he died on May 26, 1762. 
Baumgarten’s philosophical works cover a wide range of topics. The 1000 sections of his 
Metaphysica of 1739 offers a synopsis of his views, following the Wolffian division, on 
ontology, cosmology, empirical and rational psychology, and natural theology. He also published 
two influential textbooks on ethics: the Ethica philosophica (Philosophical Ethics) of 1740 and 
Initia philosophiae practicae primae (Elements of First Practical Philosophy), both of which 
Kant also regularly used in his lectures on moral philosophy. Baumgarten’s abiding interest in 
aesthetics issued in two texts, the first a dissertation entitled Meditationes philosophicae de 
nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (Reflections on Poetry) in 1735, and the second the ambitious 
Aesthetica, the first volume of which appeared in 1750, with a second unfinished volume printed 
(at the request of the publisher) in 1758. 
4.2 Philosophy 
Baumgarten’s metaphysics is frequently characterized as inclining more towards Leibniz than to 
the “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophy; for instance, he makes explicit reference to monads in his 
presentation of ontology and cosmology, and concerning the pre-established harmony he accepts 
that it obtains between all substances (not just between soul and body) and does not qualify his 
endorsement of the system as Wolff came to do (Baumgarten 1739, §761-9; cf. Watkins 2005, 
73-81 for discussion). While there is no doubt that Baumgarten adopts a fundamentally 
Leibnizian picture in his ontology, including the endorsement of the principle of sufficient 
reason, to leave it at this would be to ignore the important and fruitful role that his Pietist 
background plays in his philosophical thought (Look 2018). Indeed, Baumgarten’s originality as 
a thinker consists in his efforts to amend key planks of Leibnizian (and Wolffian) thinking in 
light of his underlying Pietist commitments. 
This is particularly evident in Baumgarten’s treatment of freedom and immortality, where 
Wolff’s position on both were targetted by his Pietist critics. By way of addressing the Pietist 
objections to Wolff’s moral intellectualism and his reduction of freedom to mere spontaneity, 
Baumgarten offers an enriched empirical psychology, one that considers the influence of 
expecations of the future (and a future life) as motives, that allows that immoral action can 
proceed not only from ignorance but also from less lively cognition of the good, and that 
explicitly distinguishes spontaneity from freedom proper (Schwaiger 2011, 82-92). On the topic 
of immortality, the Pietists had likewise objected to Wolff’s emphasis on the human soul’s 
preservation of its cognitive capacities in the afterlife, which state seems for Wolff to be 
disconnected to the human’s cultivation of virtue and piety in this life. Baumgarten seeks to 
rectify this by arguing that in addition to preserving its cognitive capacities in the afterlife, the 
soul will also retain its moral capacities including freedom, and that its condition of blessedness 
or damnation in the life to come will be a direct function of its moral condition (1739, §§782, 
791; Dyck 2018). 
Consistent with his orientation in metaphysics, Baumgarten is an original moral philosopher 
within the Wolffian tradition. He is notable, for instance, for the centrality of the notion of 
obligation in his ethics. Wolff had framed a novel concept of obligation, rooted in the nature of 
things and actions themselves rather than the will of a sovereign, in accordance with which an 
obligation arises simply insofar as some motive is naturally connected to an action (GE §9). Yet, 
whereas Wolff only treats obligation briefly before considering specific duties, in Baumgarten’s 
hands the problem of obligation becomes the unifying theme for ethics, particularly in his Initia 
(Schwaiger 2009). Moreover, while Baumgarten accepts Wolff’s ethical perfectionism, in 
contrast with Wolff he downplays the connection between perfection and happiness, perhaps in 
response to Pietist denunciations of Wolff’s perfectionism as a veiled form of hedonism 
(Schwaiger 2011, 163ff; Bacin 2014). A last innovation is Baumgarten’s consideration of the 
ways in which ethical systems themselves can be flawed in that, for instance, they make a 
virtuous condition too easily attainable (flattering ethics) or set the bar for virtue too high for 
human nature (chimerical ethics) (Thorndike 2008; Dyck 2012). 
Turning finally to Baumgarten’s aesthetics, it is notable that while Wolff himself had 
comparatively little to say about the philosophy of art (but see Beiser 2009; and Buchenau 2013), 
a number of thinkers in the Wolffian interest took a keen interest in the topic. The first to 
develop a theory of the arts, particularly poetry, was Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766), 
who published his Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen (Attempt at a Critical 
Poetry for the Germans) in 1730. Treating poetry scientifically, he set out a set of rules that were 
to guide the composition. Given his conception of what a poem was (a moral fable) and given as 
well his idea of what was involved in its composition (a set of rules), there was little room here 
for beauty and even less for sentiment and inspiration.  
It was left to Baumgarten to formulate a recognizably modern aesthetic doctrine on Wolffian 
foundations. This he did through focusing on the soul’s faculty of sensibility, ultimately 
identifying aesthetics as the science of sensible cognition. Where Wolff had conceived of the 
senses merely as providing the raw material for thinking, Baumgarten thought that the senses had 
their own rules and their own perfection, rules and perfection that differ from logical rules and 
the knowledge generated by the process of intellectual clarification. So, while representations 
might be logically perfect and attain to intensive clarity insofar as we distinguish a number of 
marks within it, representations of the senses, even as confused representations, can attain to 
extensive clarity inasmuch as they richly represent a multitude of things (Baumgarten 1735, §17). 
In this way, poetic representation can be richer, and more moving, than representations attained 
through the use of the understanding—moving since Baumgarten contends that such 
representations as (aesthetically) perfect can also occasion pleasure in us. One cannot but see the 
influence that Baumgarten likely had on Kant's Critical philosophy — his vindication of the 
senses reappears in an inherently Kantian way both in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the 
Critique of Pure Reason and in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
5. Christian August Crusius 
As Baumgarten sought in a conciliatory spirit to make the Wolffian philosophy responsive to 
Pietist concerns, Christian August Crusius mounted a renewed, Pietist-inspired but 
philosophically-sophisticated assault on the foundations of that system. Through his dissertations 
and textbooks, Crusius succeeded in raising trenchant objections to the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
philosophy, and indeed to the strongest forms of philosophical rationalism, and he formulated an 
influential and systematic alternative in which the will and its freedom are central concerns.  
5.1 Life and Works 
Christian August Crusius was born June 10, 1715 in Leuna, near Halle, the son of a pastor (and 
his mother was a pastor’s daughter). He matriculated at the University of Leipzig in 1734, where 
he studied a number of subjects but was particularly interested in theology and philosophy. At 
leipzig, Crusius came under the influence of the philosopher (and physician) Adolf Friedrich 
Hoffmann (1707–1741), a disciple of Andreas Rüdiger (1673–1731) who had been a close 
associate of Thomasius. Crusius attained the Magister in philosophy in 1737 and habilitated in 
philosophy in 1740. He followed his philosophical studies with a baccalaureat in theology in 
1742, though he would proceed to seek a position in the philosophy faculty. To this end, he 
defended two dissertations in philosophy, one of which, the Dissertatio philosophica de usu et 
limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis (Philosophical Dissertation on the 
Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called Sufficient) of 1743 was 
a critical discussion of the principle of sufficient reason. He became a professor of philosophy 
(extraordinarius) at Leipzig in 1744.  
Crusius’ major philosophical works followed in quick succession. He published his textbook on 
ethics, the Anweisung vernünftig zu Leben (Guide to Rational Living) in 1744; this was followed 
by the elaboration of his metaphysics, Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten (Sketch 
of the Necessary Truths of Reason) in 1745; and a text in logic, the Weg zur Gewißheit und 
Zuverläßigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntiß (Path to the Certainty and Reliability of Human 
Cognition) was published in 1747 (a final philosophical treatise on physics followed in 1749). As 
an ordinary professorship in philosophy was not available, Crusius joined the theology faculty at 
Leipzig in 1750. While he remained a member of the philosophy faculty and continued his 
lectures (and revised his previous publications for later editions), from this point on his original 
publications are devoted to theological topics. He died in Leipzig on October 18, 1775. 
5.2 Philosophy 
Widely, and rightly regarded as the most sophisticated philosopher within the Thomasian-Pietist 
tradition, Crusius sets out to offer an alternative to the core claims of the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
philosophy on topics in metaphysics, epistemology, logic and practical philosophy. As Lange 
had previously, Crusius targets the principle of sufficient reason, and its employment in 
Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, for criticism. Crusius diagnoses a number of ambiguities in 
the Wolffian presentation of the principle, opting himself to refer to a reason (ratio; Grund) that, 
when present, determines something to come to be such that the opposite would be impossible as 
a determining reason, and thus to refer to the principle (in the way intended by Leibniz and 
Wolff) as the principle of determining reason (Crusius 1743, §II-III). Crusius then critically 
discusses each of Wolff’s attempts to prove the principle—concerning the first such proof 
(presented in section 3.1, above), Crusius claims that the most charitable reconstruction of it is 
circular. To show this, Crusius reformulates Wolff’s proof as the following syllogism (using 
Wolff’s preferred terminology): 
 Whatever cannot come to be except from some other cause, has a sufficient reason. 
 Everything that is cannot come to be except from another cause. 
 Therefore, whatever is has a sufficient reason. (Crusius 1743, §XI/Dyck 2019, 207) 
As Crusius notes, however, the minor in this case is just a version of the principle of sufficient 
reason itself, so that as a proof of that principle this argument begs the question.  
More positively, Crusius endorses the principle of determining reason but denies that it admits of 
unlimited use which he claims, echoing Lange, would entail fatalism. Rather, Crusius excludes 
what he terms “free first [or fundamental] actions” from the scope of the principle. These actions 
are such that they proceed directly from the basic powers of the acting substance under 
appropriate circumstances (Crusius 1745, §82), but are such that they can be undertaken or 
omitted by the acting subject (that is, they are not determined) (Crusius 1743, §XXV). That such 
actions are possible, Crusius claims, is clear given that God’s action would be of this sort, but 
also given the testimony of our own inner experience, which discloses the acts of our own will to 
be just such actions (Crusius 1743, §IX). Crusius thus accepts that the principle of determining 
reason holds for all events that are not the result of a free first action, whereas free first actions 
no doubt have a cause but are not such that could not have occurred otherwise (or not at all). 
Along with his efforts to secure a place for genuine freedom of the will in his metaphysics, 
Crusius also emphasizes the limits of the human understanding. Crusius claims that the acts of 
the understanding are governed by principles, including a formal principle (the principle of 
contradiction), but also and importantly a number of “material” principles that govern what is 
thinkable for the human mind (where what is unthinkable is not for that reason contradictory). 
Among these principles are the principle of inseparability, according to which that which cannot 
be separated in thought cannot be separated in fact, and the priniciple of incombinability, 
according to which that which cannot be combined in thought cannot in fact be combined 
(Crusius 1743, §XXVII; 1745, §15). Significantly, and drawing on Thomasius (via Hoffmann, 
1737), Crusius contends that these principles which together constitute the “essence of the 
understanding” supply us with a criterion of truth, which consists in the agreement of thoughts 
with things, such that only that can be true which conforms to the principles of human 
understanding (Crusius 1745, §15; 1747, §51). These material principles are subsequently used 
by Crusius to vindicate a variety of substantive metaphysical claims, including one he dubs the 
principle of sufficient cause (Crusius 1745, §31). On this basis, Crusius erects his own 
distinctive metaphysics, proceeding through the now-established Wolffian topics, though Crusius 
assigns natural theology a place more befitting its importance and ignores empirical psychology 
which does not concern “necessary” truths of reason, the only proper subject of metaphysics.  
Crusius’ attack on Wolffianism continues in his logic and his thoughts on moral philosophy. In a 
clear rebuke of Wolff, Crusius begins his logic by rigidly distinguishing between the methods of 
mathematics and philosophy, contending that where the former makes use of demonstrations that 
rely solely on the principle of contradiction (and relate to mere possibilities or hypothetical 
realities), the latter must take into account other principles when, for instance, the investigation 
of causes are at issue (Crusius 1747, §10). Commensurate with this, Crusius’ considerations of 
the traditional topics of logic—concepts, propositions, and inferences—is thoroughly informed 
by his account of the essence of the understanding: a philosophical inference, as opposed to a 
mathematical syllogism, can have as its basis what permits of being separated or combined in 
thought (Crusius 1747, §262). Crusius also considers the relation between philosophy and 
theology or revealed religion, contending for the utility of philosophy for students of theology 
but also arguing that religion provides a needed corrective to the misuse of philosophy which, 
when left to its own devices, tends to lay claim to the unrestricted use of its principles (such as 
PSR) whereas the appropriate restrictions are typically evident to the theologian (Crusius 1747, 
§32). 
Crusius’ ethics is characterized by the principled separation of the will from the understanding as 
distinct powers, and a re-orientation of his moral theory with respect to the former. The human 
will depends on the understanding to supply it with ideas in accordance with which it acts, but 
Crusius is clear that the will is not solely determined to its action through some cognition (i.e., of 
perfection) in the act itself; rather, the goodness of an action consists more generally in its being 
conformable to the will (Crusius 1745, §26; Schneewind 1998, 447), and in any case the human 
will is always free to act or to omit to act in accordance with the understanding’s ideas. The 
human will is possessed of three basic desires—the first is for our own perfection, in accordance 
with which the talents of the intellect among others are promoted (Crusius 1745, §117); for 
unification with objects perceived as perfect, from which proceeds a drive to moral love through 
which we desire to join with other rational beings without any further end (Crusius 1745, §125); 
and finally, the desire to recognize a divine law which, despite its abstract-sounding name, is 
identified by Cruisus with the phenomenon of conscience (Gewissenstrieb). It is through 
conscience that we are able to recognize the divinely given moral law (Crusius 1745, §132), and 
conscience thereby also discloses our dependance on God as divine lawgiver (Crusius 1745, 
§165). As such, conscience supplies us with a motivation to obedience where, according to 
Crusius, this obedience constitutes an essential component (the “form”) of virtue (Crusius 1745, 
§177). A derivation of our duties thus depends on a consideration of God and His aim in creating 
the world, which Crusius identifies as all human beings’ attainment of virtue, as opposed to 
knowledge or happiness in its own right, through their free actions (Crusius 1745, §213). On this 
basis, he proceeds to derive duties to God, to others, and to the self (for discussion, see 
Schneewind 1998, 452-6).  
6. Women and Other Under-Represented Thinkers 
(Note: Treatment of these figures has not been integrated into the foregoing solely for the 
convenience of those interested primarily in their contributions.) 
A variety of circumstances—religious, political, and social—conspired to give women limited 
opportunities to engage in and with the contemporary intellectual culture, even relative to their 
French- and English-speaking contemporaries. The German-speaking lands of Europe lacked a 
major cosmopolitan center, like London or Paris, to germinate progressive ideas and to propagate 
those developed abroad. Moreover, the fact that, in spite of Thomasius’ and Wolff’s efforts, 
German intellectuals continued to publish (and teach) in Latin through the first half of the 
eighteenth century, women’s access to these ideas was limited. There were a handful of notable 
attempts by reformers (including Francke) to redress the general oversight of girls’ education, 
but by and large their education was a private matter and in any case guided by the traditional 
conception of women’s threefold Bestimmung as Gattin, Mutter, and Hausfrau (wife, mother, 
and housewife).  
Despite these substantial obstacles, however, women did engage with the figures and debates of 
the time, and indeed they contributed in various and integral ways to the history of German 
philosophy throughout the 18th century. Similar to the British and French contexts, women in 
Germany exerted an important influence on intellectual culture directly through the publication 
of conventional treatises, but also indirectly through their correspondence with well-known 
philosophers, through provoking and mediating intellectual disputes, and (particularly in the 
second half of the 18th century) through hosting salons that attracted leading philosophers and 
scientists, among others. And, likewise comparable to the British and French contexts (cf. 
O’Neill 1997), these contributions have been widely overlooked in subsequent histories of 
German philosophy, both for familiar reasons having to do both with the narrowness of the 
conception of the philosophical canon (Shapiro 2016), and due to the concerted efforts among 
19th-century German academics to exclude women from the academy (Ebbersmeyer 2020).  
6.1 Women and the Thomasian Philosophy 
Women played crucial roles in the conception, refinement, and popularization of the key ideas 
and systems of the German Enlightenment, as can be seen by considering their contributions to 
and connections with the two major early philosophical schools of the period already discussed: 
the Leibnizian-Wolffian and the Thomasian(-Pietist). With respect to Thomasius, it should be 
noted that he makes quite clear himself that his intention in publishing his works in logic and 
ethics in the vernacular was to reach a wider audience, including women. Thus, the subtitle of his 
Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason indicates that it will show “in an intelligible manner 
[how] to distinguish the true, probable, and false from one another and to discover new truths, all 
without syllogistics, for all reasonable people of whatever estate or gender they might be.” 
Among those women impacted by Thomasius’ logic is Dorothea Christiane Erxleben (née 
Leporin, 1715–62), who would later receive the first doctorate in medicine in Germany from the 
university in Halle in 1753. In 1742 she published a treatise entitled Gründliche Untersuchung 
der Ursachen, die das weibliche Geschlecht vom Studiren abhalten (Rigorous Investigation of 
the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study). While Erxleben there draws on a variety of 
sources, including Wolffian thought (cf. Stiening 2020), she makes good use of two aspects of 
Thomasius’ logic, namely, his practically-oriented account of learnedness, and the doctrine of 
prejudice presented in the concluding chapter (cf. Dyck 2021b). So, in the Rigorous 
Investigation, Erxleben defines learnedness (“Gelehrsamkeit”) as “a grounded knowledge of 
such necessary and useful truths whereby the understanding and will, and consequently true 
human happiness, are improved” (Erxleben 1742 §21/Dyck 2019, 44). Proceeding from this, she 
contends that it is important that and entirely possible for women to be able to attain such 
learnedness for sake of the concerns of ordinary life.  
Further, Erxleben identifies the widespread conviction that the attainment of learnedness is 
unsuitable for women as the result of prejudice, of which Erxleben distinguishes four principal 
types: that women are unsuited (in virtue of their natural capacities) to attain learnedness; that its 
attainment could not be useful for them; that learnedness could only be misused by women; and 
that women would only seek to attain learnedness to distinguish themselves from their peers. By 
way of rebutting these prejudices, Erxleben draws on an array of sources, including theological, 
philosophical, and medical authorities, and argues generally that whatever disparities might 
currently obtain between the apparent talents and achievements on the part of each sex are not 
the result of a difference in natural capacities but instead only evidence of the salutary effect of 
education on the human being (cf. Erxleben 1742, §71).  
6.2 Women and the Leibnizian-Wolffian Philosophy 
With respect to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, there is significant evidence of women’s 
extensive engagement with the system already at its origins. Leibniz exchanged letters with a 
number of women, but his correspondence with his patroness Electress Sophie of Hanover 
(1630–1714), who happened to be the sister of Elisabeth of Bohemia, and her daughter Queen 
Sophie Charlotte of Prussia (1668–1705), is particularly significant as it freuqently turned to 
philosophical topics. In his letters, and his personal exchanges with “the two Sophies,” Leibniz 
can be seen to refine and develop key doctrines, including his conception of substance and his 
attempted theodicy (Strickland 2011, 35-48), where Leibniz himself claimed that his Theodicée 
found its beginnings in his conversations with Sophie Charlotte. Sophie of Hanover likewise 
supplied Leibniz with one of his favourite pieces of empirical evidence for the principle of the 
identity of indiscernables (when she challenged a courtier to find two identical leaves during a 
garden stroll). Sophie of Hanover was no dogmatic Leibnizian however, as she maintained her 
commitment to physical influence between the mind and the body, and hosted controversial 
figures such as Francis Mercury Van Helmont (1614–1699) and John Toland (1670–1722) at her 
court. It is, however, debated whether Sophie shared the materialist views of these thinkers when 
it comes to the mind (de Careil 1876; Strickland 2009 and 2011, 49-64) or instead upheld a 
metaphysically agnostic view regarding the nature of the soul (Leduc 2021).  
As for the other founder of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, Wolff does not seem to have 
been similarly influenced by interaction with women in the development of his system. Through 
adopting the vernacular for his initial series of textbooks, however, he did at least indirectly 
contribute to making the latest innovations in metaphysics, ethics, politics, and physics 
accessible to a wider literate audience including women. Indeed, this hardly seems to have been 
an undesired consequence as, at one point, at the urging of the Saxon nobleman and Wolffian 
devotée Ernst Christoph Graf von Manteuffel (1676–1749), Wolff drafted the beginning of an 
introduction to Wolffian philosophy intended specifically for women (cf. Ostertag 1910). In the 
1740s and 1750s in particular, Wolffian philosophy had gained such a following among women 
of society that one commentator quipped that it was as if “an actual lycanthropy” had broken out 
(Edelmann 1740, 108). Among those women so influenced was Émilie du Châtelet (1706–49), 
who made use of foundational Wolffian metaphysical principles in her presentation of Newton’s 
physics in her Institutions de physique (1740)—Wolff and du Châtelet engaged in 
correspondence for a time, and he commended her mastery of his system to others and even 
appraised her as a more talented philosopher than her companion Voltaire. 
In addition to du Châtelet, a number of women took up the task of defending and developing 
Leibnizian-Wolffian ideas. None were more active in this than Luise Adelgunde Viktorie 
Gottsched (née Kulmus, 1713–62), whose husband Johann Christoph (section 4.2 above) was a 
Wolffian disciple who made contributions to philosophy (metaphysics and aesthetics), as well as 
to literary theory and the development of German letters. In virtue of her ambitious education 
(especially in languages), Luise Gottsched contributed extensively to Johann Christoph’s efforts 
to promote German letters and theatre, and was a prolific translator, both in the context of her 
husband’s ambitious projects and in her own right. Thus, she made substantial contributions to 
Johann Christoph’s translations of Leibniz’s Theodicée (J. C. Gottsched 1744) and of Bayle’s 
Dictionaire historique et critique (1741-44) (for other philosophical translations, see Brown 
2012). She also translated Réflexions nouvelles sur les femmes (1727; L. A. V. Gottsched 1731) 
by the Parisian salonnière Anne-Thésèse, Marquise de Lambert and produced a translation of 
and an original response to Madeleine Angélique Poisson de Gomez’s Le triomphe de 
l’éloquence (1730; L. A. V. Gottsched 1739), which emphasized the importance of education 
(including philosophy) for woman’s cultivation of virtue. 
Another notable figure in this respect is Johanna Charlotte Unzer (née Ziegler, 1725–82), who 
was raised in an intellectual family in Halle: her uncle J. G. Krüger (1715–59) was a well-known 
Wolffian scientist, and Baumgarten’s student G. F. Meier was a close family friend. Unzer 
herself would become a renowned poet, though she produced a highly original philosophical 
contribution to Wolffian thought in her Grundriß einer Weltweisheit für das Frauenzimmer 
(Outline of a Philosophy for the Lady) of 1751. In that text, Unzer seeks to present the doctrines 
of Leibnizian-Wolffian logic and metaphysics in an aesthetically perfect manner, often making 
use of poetry to provide a moving illustration of an otherwise abstruse theorem. In the process, 
Unzer grants German women access to the most challenging and controversial philosophical 
debates of her time (including Wolff’s account of scientific reasoning, the challenge of 
materialism, and the Leibnizian doctrine of monads) with the intention of equipping her female 
readers to engage in speculative and scientific investigations themselves. At the same time, she 
offers a dynamic revision and re-orientation of the Wolffian philosophy which, significantly, 
attempts to carve out a space for the (as yet unfounded) discipline of aesthetics (Buchenau 2021).  
6.3 Anton Wilhelm Amo 
A final figure worthy of mention in this context is Anton Wilhelm Amo, the first African-born 
professor of philosophy in Germany. Amo was born in Axim in present-day Ghana around 1700, 
but was brought to the Netherlands as a small boy in 1707 through the Dutch West India 
Company. Shortly after, he was given to the young Anton Ulrich, Duke of Wolfenbüttel-
Braunschweig, and baptized on July 29, 1708. Amo evidently worked as a servant in the Duke’s 
court in Wolffenbüttel, though he would also receive an education, including in Latin, which 
prepared him sufficiently for study at the Friedrichs-Universität in Halle, where he matriculated 
on June 9, 1727. There, Amo studied philosophy and law, and it is reported that he presented a 
(now lost) disputation in November 1729 entitled De jure maurorum in Europa (On the Rights of 
Moors in Europe), in which he contended (according to a contemporary account) against the 
legality of slavery in the Holy Roman Empire given that the privileges granted to African kings 
by the (old) Roman Emperor meant that they were vassals of the Empire, and entitled to 
consideration under the law.  
Amo matriculated at the university in nearby Wittenberg the following year, and was promptly 
awarded a Magister in philosophy. While in Wittenberg, Amo wrote a dissertation, entitled De 
humanae mentis apatheia (On the Impassivity of the Human Mind) in 1734, which qualified him 
to teach, and later in the same year he supervised a dissertation which he is also thought to have 
had a hand (at least) in writing (Menn and Smith 2020, 68-71). Amo would return to teach 
philosophy at Halle, and in 1738 published a wide-ranging manual for his philosophical lectures, 
Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi (Treatise on the Art of Philosophizing 
Soberly and Accurately). Not long after, however, Amo applies for a position at the University of 
Jena, claiming indigence, and he is granted permission to lecture there in 1740. For reasons that 
we can only speculate about, Amo would request passage on a ship to return to Africa in 1746 
(Menn and Smith 2020, 38), and it was in Axim that a Swiss doctor would report encountering 
Amo in the early 1750s. Amo is thought to have died not long after.  
In his principal philosophical work, the dissertation on Impassivity, he argues against the claim 
that the soul can be endowed with a passive faculty of sensation, a position he identifies as 
stemming from Descartes (Amo 1734a, 13-14/Menn and Smith 2020, 179). Amo understands the 
human mind to be a species of spirit, which is purely active and immaterial. Were the mind to be 
endowed with a capacity to sense, it would have to be able to receive ideas, and in one of three 
ways: by “communication” (i.e., in the manner that fire “communicates” its heat to an object), by 
penetration (i.e., through interposition of another entity), or by direct contact (Amo 1734a, 
5/Menn and Smith 2020, 161). Amo argues that it is impossible to conceive of the mind 
receiving ideas in any of these ways as it would violate its essence as a spontaneous being and its 
immaterial nature precludes transmission through contact (for discussion, see Walsh 2019). 
Perplexingly, in spite of contending for the soul’s impassivity, Amo endorses the Aristotelian 
dictum that “nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses” (Amo 1734b, 6). Amo also 
affirms the mind’s capacity to influence the body (Amo 1734a 8/Menn and Smith 2020, 169), 
though without accounting for how he takes this to be possible or explicitly engaging with the 
debate relating to the pre-established harmony. Nonetheless, in his lifetime Amo was identified 
by at least one influential historian as a Wolffian thinker (Ludovici 1738, §202). 
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